# Free Will vs Determinism



## Esteban (Dec 8, 2014)

> If man's consciousness were automatic, if it did react deterministically to outer or inner forces acting upon it, then, by definition, a man would have no choice in regard to his mental content; he would accept whatever he had to accept, whatever ideas the determining forces engendered in him. In such a case, one could not prescribe methods to guide a man's thought or ask him to justify his ideas; the subject of epistemology would be inapplicable. One cannot ask a person to alter or, justify the mentally
> inescapable, any more than, in physical terms, one can ask him to alter or justify his patellar reflex. In regard to the involuntary, there is no alternative but to submit-to do what one must, whatever it is.
> 
> The concept of "volition" is one of the roots of the concept of "validation" (and of its subdivisions, such as "proof"). A validation of ideas is necessary and possible only because man's consciousness is volitional. This applies to any idea, including the advocacy of free will: to ask for its proof is to presuppose the reality of free will.
> ...


I got the above from Objectivism:The Philosophy of Ayn Rand by Leonard Peikoff.

So, where do you stand on the issue? What do you think of the Objectivist argument for free will? I'm guessing most of you are determinists.


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## a degree of freedom (Sep 28, 2011)

_Something _is being argued against in the excerpt, and I'm down with it, but it is way too narrow to be called determinism proper. It's more like fatalism.


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## Esteban (Dec 8, 2014)

senkora said:


> _Something _is being argued against in the excerpt, and I'm down with it, but it is way too narrow to be called determinism proper. It's more like fatalism.


What do you mean by determinism proper and how do the arguments from the excerpt not apply to it?


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## a degree of freedom (Sep 28, 2011)

Esteban said:


> What do you mean by determinism proper and how do the arguments from the excerpt not apply to it?


Something is deterministic when a complete description of a system's rules, its starting condition, and its inputs over time, determine at any given time for which this description remains complete, a single possible system state. (Brush concerns from quantum mechanics politely under the rug and say "close enough!" in order to entertain it.)

The primary difference between determinism by that definition and determinism as the author wants to use it is explained by the considerable gap between what any one of us actually knows about the relevant system, our brain, and what can potentially be known about it, which requires everyone, regardless of the power or weakness of determinism in the background, to act _as though_ we were free agents according to what we do know and our feelings and heuristics about how to act within that incomplete description.

Visiting the first paragraph, the author concludes that if we were to take consciousness as automatic or somehow determined that a person would no longer have basis to justify or potential to alter their thoughts and ideas because these things would be fixed from the beginning and given to the person as though externals. There is no reason to reach a conclusion like that because what exactly is determined is in no way knowable to the person until after the fact in practice. For all that person knows, their changing their mind or justifying their thoughts or thinking as though all of these things originated within them as objects they genuinely control and have power over was exactly the single determined course from the outset. So determinism if we call it "true" or "significantly true" or somehow important is like a set of closing doors behind you with the way they will close ahead of you completely unknowable in practice and so indistinguishable from free will. The person who argues that their thoughts and ideas are determined and therefore immalleable, commits an error of believing they can know something they can't about what exactly is determined. Let the author disabuse such people of their errors, but don't think this has touched deeper down into whether what is or what becomes can be said to be "determined" or "significantly determined" or some other qualified or elsewise defined sense of "determined".

If you say, "but then if this determinism is true this free will is somehow illusory or its power is diminished" or "I've been casting these things as genuinely under my control when the outcome could only be one way and this is incompatible", I'll say that _as a practical matter_ nothing is actually any different and that your practical philosophy is always prime.


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## Milco (Dec 12, 2009)

> If man's consciousness were automatic, if it did react deterministically to outer or inner forces acting upon it, then, by definition, a man would have no choice in regard to his mental content; he would accept whatever he had to accept, whatever ideas the determining forces engendered in him. In such a case, one could not prescribe methods to guide a man's thought


How does that follow?
Just because a glass falls under the effect of gravity without free will, doesn't mean that you can't catch it before it breaks on the floor.
Ayn Rand seems generally pretty wonky in her ideas and philosophies.

There are some different definitions of free will, where some define any indeterminism as free will - actually even some saying determinism and free will can coexist.
I'm quite a bit more strict in my definition of it though, as the others seem to redefine it away from the intuitive understanding just to be able to conclude that it does exist.
It's unclear whether determinism or indeterminism is ultimately true, but regardless, free will, in the truly free sense, seems only an illusion.


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## SplendidBob (May 28, 2014)

Any chance you could clarify the main argument here? It rather wordy and obfuscated (or I am perhaps too stupid) I can't really make out what the actual argument is 

Is it saying that in order to ask questions about free will (and believe that determinism exists) you have to have free will to do so? - that in order to purposefully think about something, it is self evident you have free will in order to make that purposeful action of thinking? 

There seems to be something in there about free will being necessary for the acquisition of knowledge, but this just seems to mistake cognition for free will. I can understand such arguments seeming (at least) intuitive in a pre computer era, but obviously computation (and advanced computation, as per our brains) doesn't require free will. A computer program can make a 'choice' through a simple series of else if statements. 

The bit at the start saying 'it feels like we have free will so we have free will' is nonsensical, obviously 

Could you clarify the argument a little more? maybe I haven't fully understood the point being made.


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## Vuldoc (Sep 8, 2011)

I tried to understand this topic a long time ago. I just found determinism hard or soft to be stupid. That's just my opinion so don't mind me continue on with this thread


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## Esteban (Dec 8, 2014)

Milco said:


> Just because a glass falls under the effect of gravity without free will, doesn't mean that you can't catch it before it breaks on the floor.


No, but it does mean, excepting reflexes, you don't choose to catch it or not. Whether you catch it or not is the result of antecedent events. You had no choice in the matter.



Milco said:


> Ayn Rand seems generally pretty wonky in her ideas and philosophies.


Agreed. It's kind of why I like it. It's different than other contemporary philosophies, especially with its foundationalism and comprehensive scope. I'm not an Objectivist, but I think it's interesting.



Milco said:


> It's unclear whether determinism or indeterminism is ultimately true, but regardless, free will, in the truly free sense, seems only an illusion.


Extrospectively, it seems to be an illusion, I agree. Introspectively, I'm not so sure, which is why the presupposition argument is interesting to me.


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## Esteban (Dec 8, 2014)

splendidbob said:


> Any chance you could clarify the main argument here? It rather wordy and obfuscated (or I am perhaps too stupid) I can't really make out what the actual argument is


Well, I'll try, but only if you stop winking at me. It's making me uncomfortable.



splendidbob said:


> Is it saying that in order to ask questions about free will (and believe that determinism exists) you have to have free will to do so? - that in order to purposefully think about something, it is self evident you have free will in order to make that purposeful action of thinking?


Free will is the ability to consciously choose actions, beliefs, etc.

If you don't have free will, then you have no choice about what you believe. You can't chose to follow logic or not. You didn't choose to believe in determinism or not. Since humans make mistakes, you can't know if what you believe is the result of a mistake, fallacy, etc., or not. So, determinism is self-defeating. Proof and knowledge are impossible without presupposing free will.

When determinists claim determinism as true, they presuppose free will. They presuppose they consciously chose determinism. They presuppose they consciously chose to adhere to knowledge and truth. In other words, they've presupposed free will.

Much like the law of non-contradiction and identity, one has to presuppose free will to appeal to proof and knowledge. They are axioms that do not require proof themselves because they are what make such things possible. So, if you argue against free will, you have to presuppose such axioms.



splendidbob said:


> There seems to be something in there about free will being necessary for the acquisition of knowledge, but this just seems to mistake cognition for free will.


It's not mistaking cognition for free will. It's saying in order to direct your conscious cognition, you must presuppose free will.



splendidbob said:


> A computer program can make a 'choice' through a simple series of else if statements.


Calling that a choice is an anthropomorphism. Computer programs aren't conscious.



splendidbob said:


> The bit at the start saying 'it feels like we have free will so we have free will' is nonsensical, obviously


Strawman.


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## Milco (Dec 12, 2009)

Esteban said:


> No, but it does mean, excepting reflexes, you don't choose to catch it or not. Whether you catch it or not is the result of antecedent events. You had no choice in the matter.


That doesn't seem like a bad thing though.
I don't really understand the appeal of free will, if I have to be honest. Acting according to will alone seems sufficient, no need for it to be "free".



> If you don't have free will, then you have no choice about what you believe. You can't chose to follow logic or not. You didn't choose to believe in determinism or not. Since humans make mistakes, you can't know if what you believe is the result of a mistake, fallacy, etc., or not. So, determinism is self-defeating. Proof and knowledge are impossible without presupposing free will.
> 
> When determinists claim determinism as true, they presuppose free will. They presuppose they consciously chose determinism. They presuppose they consciously chose to adhere to knowledge and truth. In other words, they've presupposed free will.


That doesn't seem to follow logically. At all, really.
That argument sounds a lot more like the arguments made for the existence of god "by reason alone", which are fundamentally flawed, because they make assumptions about how reality must be, which are biased in their favour to enable them to conclude what they want.
Free will makes neither proof nor knowledge more possible than they are without it.


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## truant (Jul 4, 2014)

Long meandering rant:

Even if every aspect of our lives is strictly determined, our subjective experience of having free will will still be there. We are always going to feel, on some level, that we are free to make choices. That subjective experience of freedom itself is probably determined and it factors into all of our decisions, so we're going to be stuck acting "as if" we and other people had free will, even if we don't. You can't escape the feeling that, at times, you _have_ to make a choice, and that that choice will have consequences which you have to accept responsibility for. That's primary to being a self-conscious agent. I'm not sure consciousness even exists without this subjective feeling of choice.

Even if you argue that criminals are not responsible for their actions because all of their actions were predetermined, we're still going to look for the best way to discourage criminal behavior; our physical and subjective responses to punishment are also determined, and also have some degree of influence over our behavior, so we will continue to punish people for their crimes "as if" they had free will because whether or not their actions were freely chosen will be irrelevant -- all that matters is whether or not the punishment is an effective way of conditioning new behavior in the criminal. It makes absolutely no difference whether or not the punishment leads one to reflect and "freely choose" different behavior, or if it merely determines new behavior which the criminal experiences, subjectively, as "freely chosen". At that point, you're arguing semantics.

In fact, when it comes right down to it, I think the debate about free will vs determinism is mostly a logical phantom. What we have is a subjective experience of the world; some of the elements of that experience seem "hard" or unbending, so we call them determined; others seem "soft" or malleable so we call those free choices and actions; then there are all kinds of things somewhere in the middle that people debate whether they're more voluntary, or more determined.

I don't believe there are two separate fields: determined and freely chosen; I believe there are merely aspects of our experience which we experience as chosen, and others we experience as being thrust on us, and that varies slightly from person to person, or even in the same person from moment to moment. I would even go so far as to argue that some people, who feel that they are subjectively freer than other people are, in fact, _actually_ freer than others, in a practical sense, simply because the belief in their own freedom will produce different responses to external stimuli than the responses that will be produced by someone who experiences themselves as being subjectively less free. They will experience certain things as being 'malleable' that others won't, and that feeling of malleability, or freedom, will produce different behavioral responses. So some individuals will be 'less free', relatively speaking, than others, based purely on whether or not they believe in free will. It follows that the widespread cultural belief in free will will produce individuals capable of actions that are inaccessible to individuals in cultures where that widespread cultural belief is lacking. Those cultures and eras will likely see more ambitious behavior and risk taking and accomplishments. Which means it's possible to argue a case for promulgating the idea of free will whether free will is factually true or not.


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## Milco (Dec 12, 2009)

truant said:


> Even if you argue that criminals are not responsible for their actions because all of their actions were predetermined, we're still going to look for the best way to discourage criminal behavior


Yeah, whether or not there is free will doesn't actually change whether or not we can use measures for crime prevention.
But it might change the perspective some. Some countries, seemingly particularly those with harsh sentences, place a lot of emphasis on free will and people freely choosing to commit crime as justification for the long sentence. If we accept that it isn't always that 'free' and if we instead look at what can discourage crime, and long sentence have really no effect there, those systems might change to something that actually prevents crime, rather than only harshly punishing it.
You can do that in a system that has an idea of 'free will' as well of course, but accepting the will isn't free seems to guide you towards such a system.

There are some aspects of society that implicitly or explicitly rely on free will.
Democratic constitutions tend to make reference to them, but I think it's just 'will' of the people that's required for democracy to be just, not 'free will' of the people.
But in terms of political campaigns and advertisement in general, it seems harder to justify particularly misleading campaigns if the recipient can't freely choose to remain unaffected.
The psychological study of how to manipulate people to sell them things or make them adopt desirable behaviour raises more ethical questions if we don't have free will than it necessarily would if we had.


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## SplendidBob (May 28, 2014)

Esteban said:


> Free will is the ability to consciously choose actions, beliefs, etc.
> 
> If you don't have free will, then you have no choice about what you believe. You can't chose to follow logic or not. You didn't choose to believe in determinism or not. Since humans make mistakes, you can't know if what you believe is the result of a mistake, fallacy, etc., or not. So, determinism is self-defeating. Proof and knowledge are impossible without presupposing free will.


A determined brain can perfectly well test his beliefs against the facts of reality, or do only those who have libertarian free will have the ability to test against reality?

Whether determinists are certain in their belief bears no relevance as to whether determinism is _actually_ true or not. Why would determinism being true or not hinge on whether someone can be sure about their belief in determinism? Why must an entity that is determined be infallible to error? (you are making this claim if you believe the certainty of a determinist is indicative of the truth of determinism).

Certainty of belief simply doesn't have any impact on what is true or not.

I guess this robot has free will though since it has knowledge and proof about the position of the items it is climbing over.


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## ugh1979 (Aug 27, 2010)

truant said:


> Long meandering rant:
> 
> Even if every aspect of our lives is strictly determined, our subjective experience of having free will will still be there. We are always going to feel, on some level, that we are free to make choices. That subjective experience of freedom itself is probably determined and it factors into all of our decisions, so we're going to be stuck acting "as if" we and other people had free will, even if we don't. You can't escape the feeling that, at times, you _have_ to make a choice, and that that choice will have consequences which you have to accept responsibility for. That's primary to being a self-conscious agent. I'm not sure consciousness even exists without this subjective feeling of choice.
> 
> ...


Good post. I agree with all of this.

There is no escaping what may just be the illusion of free will, so we may as well live life thinking we have it and that we are in at least some control of our destinies.

Thinking everything is preordained probably isn't going to benefit someone over thinking they typically have a choice.


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## 629753 (Apr 7, 2015)

There are things that happen - You cant control them or prevent them.

But you can choose how to handle them.

Thats pretty much a brief resume that i tell to myself.


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## Erroll (Jan 18, 2016)

impedido10 said:


> There are things that happen - You cant control them or prevent them.
> 
> But you can choose how to handle them.
> 
> Thats pretty much a brief resume that i tell to myself.


I think that the things that have happened to us can constrict our freedom of choice in the future.

The socially anxious person has probably had social experiences that make it hard for him to trust people. This lack of trust makes it harder for the sufferer to choose how he will relate to people.

Truthfully, our every experience leaves an impression on us. Our experiences make us who we are.

A baby has had very little experience and has almost no freedom of choice. The caregivers make choices for the baby. Choices made later, in childhood or adulthood are all colored by previous experiences that the caregivers has made for us.

We make choices based on our unique collection of past experiences, over which we have little or no control. You might say that we have free will to make choices. But we do not have complete control control over the way the world has shaped our thinking and values; we don't have complete control over who we become. Stephen Hawking can not choose to play tennis.

Consciousness is a state machine. The choices it will make are determined by the state it finds itself in, when the opportunity for choice arises.


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## fredbloggs02 (Dec 14, 2009)

I read two pickearing assaults on free will a while ago: The Illusion of Free will by Sam Harris and The Nonsense of Free will by Richard Oerton. They did provide some evidence which made me think, such as the Libet experiment. They argue persuasively but ultimately, I think, speciously. I found their arguments against free will inconclusive.

I disagree an illusion of free will is sufficient, since without free will there is no sense in justice or guilt. Free will being false would strip one of individuality and agency in a crucial way. 

I believe libertarian free will is the only form of free will worth having. Compatibilism is an evasion. And determinism is an unjustified metaphysic which degrades human beings.


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## ugh1979 (Aug 27, 2010)

fredbloggs02 said:


> I read a couple of the latest assaults on free will a while ago: the Illusion of Free will by Sam Harris and The Nonsense of Free will by Richard Oerton. I quickly saw through the rhetorical metaphysics both men use to make their case. There are some points that made me think, such as the Libet experiments. Even so, I find arguments against free will inconclusive.


Can you provide any form of rebuttal to their claims?



> I disagree only an illusion of free will is necessary, since without free will there is no sense in culpability or shame. Lack of it would strip one of individuality and agency in a crucial way. I think libertarian free will free will is the only form of free will worth having.


How would the illusion of free will result in no sense in culpability or shame? If you think you are culpable due to the illusion then so be it. It makes sense that we should think we are responsible for our actions even if we aren't to the degree of being absolute free will.

Do you think your concious mind is free from any sub-concious elements that control or restrict its freedom to choose? No one is saying our concious mind can't have some degree of choice and ability to veto actions our sub-concious mind may push to it, but absolute free will? No, that's impossible IMO, and I don't agree that libertarian free will as you say is the only type of free will worth having.

For me degrees of free will are definitely worth having.


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## hoddesdon (Jul 28, 2011)

ugh1979 said:


> How would the illusion of free will result in no sense in culpability or shame? If you think you are culpable due to the illusion then so be it. It makes sense that we should think we are responsible for our actions even if we aren't to the degree of being absolute free will.
> 
> Do you think your concious mind is free from any sub-concious elements that control or restrict its freedom to choose? No one is saying our concious mind can't have some degree of choice and ability to veto actions our sub-concious mind may push to it, but absolute free will? No, that's impossible IMO, and I don't agree that libertarian free will as you say is the only type of free will worth having.
> 
> For me degrees of free will are definitely worth having.


Does that mean that you have changed your position? - see:
http://www.socialanxietysupport.com...hing-at-all-138278/index8.html#post1060623096


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## ugh1979 (Aug 27, 2010)

hoddesdon said:


> Does that mean that you have changed your position? - see:
> http://www.socialanxietysupport.com...hing-at-all-138278/index8.html#post1060623096


Can you explain where you think my position has changed. :?


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## SplendidBob (May 28, 2014)

fredbloggs02 said:


> I disagree an illusion of free will is sufficient, since without free will there is no sense in justice or guilt. Free will being false would strip one of individuality and agency in a crucial way.
> 
> I believe libertarian free will is the only form of free will worth having. Compatibilism is an evasion. And determinism is an unjustified metaphysic which degrades human beings.


This is an appeal to consequences though I think.

Libertarian free will is the one type that _cannot_ be true because it relies on individuals being able to make decisions free from determinism. So it is a claim of one of two things:

1. Determinism is false
2. People are gods within their heads and are not subject to determinism.

Both of these are troublesome.

If there is going to be 'free will' it needs to be compatibilism.

I will post something here a bit later, which is what I think is the strongest argument for free will


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## SplendidBob (May 28, 2014)

Right, been a while since I read about this, and my mind is kinda working badly today, so I will just lazily stick a quote in from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy rather than attempt to explain it myself (this is a compatibilist argument that argues for free will with determinism being true).

So the Principle of Alternative Possibilities:



> A person is morally responsible for what she does do only if she can do otherwise.


Given determinism, a person cannot do other than what they do, that is their previous actions would be the _only_ actions they could have taken in a deterministic universe (thus they cannot be held responsible for them).

So the argument against this is as follows (it attempts to show moral responsibility even if the person cannot do otherwise):



> Central to Frankfurt's attack on PAP is a type of example in which an agent is morally responsible, but could not, at the time of the pertinent action, do otherwise. Here is a close approximation to the example Frankfurt presented in his original paper:
> 
> Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened.
> 
> In this example, Jones shot Smith on his own, and did so unencumbered - did so freely. But, given Black's presence in the scenario, Jones could not have done otherwise than shoot Smith. Hence, we have a counterexample to PAP.


There is (imo) a flaw in this though, it simply presupposes that Jones resolving to shoot Smith under his own steam is free will and not subject to deterministic forces. It is set up as follows:

1. Jones decides to shoot smith or doesn't = morally culpable
2. Black intervenes and forces Jones = not morally culpable
3. Jones chose to do it (as per 1) but had not choice because of the possibility of 2) but is still morally culpable because Jones_ didn't_ intervene.

The problem is though, in a deterministic universe, 1. isn't a choice at all, the decision he made (on his own) to a determinist, would be the only one he could have made.

Something like that, my brain is kinda hazy today


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